(2) A proposition is singular simpliciter iff it is singular wrt (with respect to) some object.
Since the proposition expressed by (1) is singular wrt H.W., it counts as singular simpliciter.
We can define generality in terms of either absolute or relative singularity.
(3) A proposition is general iff it is not singular simpliciter iff it is not singular wrt any object.
Note that this definition of generality means that a sentence in which a description picking out o is used need not express a proposition that is general simpliciter. 1 Whether it does depends on whether the sentence includes certain other devices. Consider the following variation on the example above.
(4) The 43rd US President respects George W. Bush.
Since W. is the 43rd US President, someone uttering (4) picks out W. once by description and once by name. Does (4) express a proposition that is singular with respect to W.? We've said that the proposition expressed by (1) is singular wrt H.W. and thus singular simpliciter. It seems that we should similarly say that the proposition expressed by (4) is singular wrt W. and thus singular simpliciter.
Third, throughout my discussion I will be (and already have been) using an intuitive notion of aboutness. 2 This notion does not presuppose the distinction between referential and nonreferential terms or the distinction between singular and general propositions. The proposition that the tallest mountain is over 8,000m is about Mount Everest in the pre-theoretic sense of 'about', just as much as is the proposition that Mount Everest is over 8,000m. Since only the latter would standardly be considered singular, appealing to aboutness does not unfairly allow us to begin with what we were trying to end up with. And the notion is not without content, as some propositions, e.g. that there are no gold mountains, do not intuitively count as about any particular object. Aboutness, if analyzable at all, cannot be analyzed within the confines of the present paper. But the notion is taken for granted by most authors who offer explanations of singularity, so I can fairly assume it is common ground in what follows. (The reader may note as we proceed that various of the proposals argued against below would have even more immediate problems if they were formulated without use of 'about'.)
Fourth, I will set aside the question of whether it is appropriate to use the term 'singular' to describe the relationship between a proposition and a property, rather than an object. There is little if any discussion in the literature of examples such as the proposition that coldness is 1 I take generality simpliciter to capture what is sometimes described in the literature with the phrase 'purely general' (see, e.g., Markosian (2004: 53) ). 2 Cf. Hawthorne and Manley (4) .
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Pg. 4 of 29 unpleasant. Is this singular wrt coldness? Perhaps a distinction is called for here, as there is a contrast between the proposition that coldness is unpleasant and the proposition that the property that causes shivering is unpleasant. But if the former is singular wrt coldness, what about the proposition that ice is cold? Coldness is predicatively involved in this proposition (to put it vaguely), but the relationship between the proposition and the property doesn't seem "indirect" in the way it does in the case of the proposition that the property that causes shivering is unpleasant. Rather than attempting to deal with these issues at length here (interesting though I think they are), I will restrict the terms 'singular', 'general', and 'about' to uses where they describe the relationships between propositions and particulars. I will describe the role of properties by saying, e.g., that all the propositions mentioned above "concern" the property of coldness. (See below for more on concerning.)
Direct aboutness and non-qualitativeness
Now, a particularly simple attempt to define singularity might appeal only to a notion of aboutness: a singular proposition is a proposition about a particular object (or objects), whereas a general proposition isn't about any particular object. Or perhaps 'about' might be replaced by 'involves', as when Recanati (2010: 142) writes that a singular proposition is "a proposition involving individual objects as well as properties". Probably Recanati doesn't intend this as a serious explanation of singularity, but in any case, he cannot be appealing to the pre-theoretic notion of aboutness that many other philosophers appeal to. The proposition that the tallest mountain is cold counts by everyday criteria as about Mount Everest (assuming we're restricting our attention to Earthly mountains), but if we classify that proposition as singular wrt Mount Everest, we've certainly failed to capture the phenomena philosophers have been aiming at.
A more plausible interpretation of 'involves' would take it to be a technical term that required some closer connection between the proposition and the object. This is commonly indicated explicitly when authors write of a proposition being "directly about" or "directly involving" an object. For example, Alvin Plantinga writes: "I shall say that a proposition directly about some object is a singular proposition" (1983: 3). He cites Arthur Prior as his source for the phrase, 3 but it was used in Prior's sense decades earlier (e.g., in Langford 1929) . While 'directly about' may be suggestive, it isn't particularly clear. What is the connection supposed to be between an object and the proposition that is directly about it? A helpful elaboration is given by Robert Adams, who states that "A singular proposition is, roughly, a proposition that involves or refers to an individual directly, and not by way of its qualitative properties or its relations to another individual" (1981: 6). Here Adams not only specifies that the way in which Pg. 5 of 29 the proposition involves the individual must be direct, but he includes a clause intended to point to the relevant contrast. Similarly, Recanati contrasts being "directly" about objects with being about objects "indirectly, qua bearers of such and such properties " (2010: 142 a constituent of p is a property of o. So it seems that p is about o in virtue of o's properties, and thus fails to satisfy the last clause of (DA). This contradicts our assumption that p is singular wrt o. 5 A similar problem could be posed using other theories of propositions, but it is worrying enough to note that (DA) immediately rules out a view of propositions that is not only common, but is commonly taken to provide the most straightforward way to distinguish singular from general propositions (see the discussion of (AC) below).
Perhaps proponents of (DA) would not want to count the Russellian idea as one according to which a proposition is about an object in virtue of that object's properties. But then what would 4 All theses discussed should be necessitated biconditionals, but I ignore this for simplicity. 5 This point illustrates the need for clarification of another influential account of singularity, but in this case singularity of thoughts. Kent Bach (1987) , though denying the existence of singular propositions, proposes that a de re thought is one whose connection to the object it's about is relational rather than satisfactional. My worry for (DA) applies here, too: The object to which a singular thought has a relational connection will be whatever object satisfies some condition (perhaps, e.g., a causal connection Regarding the negative character of this definition, see the discussion of (AP) below. 7 Actually, the conclusion should be that Mary and Mary' are not picking out their brothers using purely qualitative properties. They could be picking their brothers using properties defined in terms of other individuals, e.g. spacetime points. But in that case, there would still be some objects (the spacetime points) that Mary and Mary' are talking or thinking about without talking or thinking about them as whatever has certain properties. A similar point applies in the 'I'm hungry' case -someone might claim that Mary's thought is best expressed as "the thinker of this thought is hungry". That would still establish that Mary is thinking about something (her thought) non-qualitatively, since otherwise she couldn't pick out her own thought rather than that of Mary'. propositions, then we should aim to do justice to (NQ).
Why not simply take Fine's idea of automorphisms to provide our elaboration of (NQ) and account of singularity? We would need to go into more detail about the sense in which a singular proposition would distinguish between qualitatively identical worlds (Fine says that a purely general proposition "contains any world isomorphic to one of its members"), but the rough idea would be this:
A proposition p about an object o is singular wrt o iff p distinguishes between a pair of worlds w and w' such that w contains o, w' contains an object o' instead of o, but w and w' are qualitatively identical.
If we could make sense of qualitative duplicates of abstract objects, then Fine's idea would certainly be worth further consideration. But as hard as it is to imagine there being two qualitatively identical worlds that differ in which physical objects they contain, it is even harder to imagine there being two worlds that contain numerically distinct but qualitatively identical abstract objects. This is important because propositions can be singular wrt abstract objects (e.g. the proposition that pi is an interesting number), and as we will see, this fact causes major problems for some accounts of singularity. We cannot simply set aside all cases of propositions about numbers, sets, and so on, so if Fine's idea were to work, we would need to have one world containing pi and another world containing a qualitative duplicate of pi. I cannot make sense of that suggestion. This explanation of direct aboutness leads us to one of the most common contemporary ideas about singularity.
Constituency and metaphysical neutrality
According to Kaplan, sentences containing directly referential terms have singular propositions as their contents. He describes these contents as follows:
If I may wax metaphysical in order to fix an image, let us think of the vehicles of evaluation -the what-is-said in a given context -as propositions. Don't think of propositions as sets of possible worlds, but rather as structured entities looking something like the sentences which express them. For each occurrence of a singular term in a sentence there will be a corresponding constituent in the proposition expressed. The constituent of the proposition determines, for each circumstance of evaluation, the object relevant to evaluating the proposition in that circumstance. In general, the constituent of the proposition will be some sort of complex, constructed from various attributes by logical composition. But in the case of a singular term which is directly referential, the constituent of the proposition is just the object itself. Thus it is that it does not just turn out that the constituent determines the same object in every circumstance, the constituent (corresponding to a rigid designator) just is the object. There is no determining to do at all. (Kaplan 1989: 494) This characterization of singular propositions is one Kaplan repeats elsewhere: "Let us adopt the terminology singular proposition for those (purported) propositions which contain individuals as immediate constituents, and general proposition for the others" (Kaplan 1975: 724) . This is commonly endorsed by other contemporary authors, as when Nathan Salmon writes that singular propositions are "structured propositions directly about some individual, which occurs directly as a constituent of the proposition" (Salmon 1990: 217) . 10 We can represent these structured propositions with angle brackets, e.g. ⟨ o, F-ness ⟩ is the proposition that o is F, a proposition that has o as a constituent.
10 See also (Salmon 2005c: 207) , (Salmon 2005b: 291) , and (King 2014) .
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Often, singularity is defined not simply by saying that the proposition contains the individual and is directly about the individual, but by saying that it is directly about the individual by or in virtue of containing it. For example, Kaplan describes Russell's view as follows: "There are propositions (call them singular) that attribute properties directly to an individual, by having the individual itself occupy the subject place in the proposition" (Kaplan 1986: 239) . Nelson and Fitch (2009) Why favor a neutral account of singularity? There are two main reasons. First, we've seen that there is a basic idea that all accounts of singularity should aim to capture, (NQ), and that idea is statable independently of any theory of the metaphysics of propositions. So if it is possible to capture that idea more precisely without such a theory, then choosing a formulation of the idea confined to some particular theory of propositions would be to stick our necks out unnecessarily while preventing other theorists from making use of the notions being 11 Note the use by Nelson and Fitch, as well as Salmon, of 'about'. 12 Others have worried, however. Plantinga (1983: 9) complains, "It's not at all clear what is being claimed when it is claimed that propositions have constituents. Insofar as we have a grasp of that notion, however, it is very hard to see how a person could be a constituent of a proposition." For more specific concerns about how to characterise constituency, see Armstrong and Stanley (2011) . For positive suggestions, see Hawthorne and Manley (2012: 14) and (King 2014) .
Pg. 11 of 29 explicated. 13 There is thus a practical reason for searching for a neutral alternative to (AC).
Second, the notion of a singular proposition seems of a kind with other notions for which it would be inappropriate to offer explanations that presupposed a particular metaphysics of propositions. Suppose, as might well happen, that we had a use for a notion of a quantificational proposition, and so we aimed to give an account of what it is for a proposition to be quantificational. If we favoured a Russellian structured-proposition view, we could say something like this: A quantificational proposition is one whose immediate constituents are a property or pair of properties and a certain sort of higher-order relation or function. But this seems a bit theoretically loaded. It would be fair to hope that a notion like quantificational proposition could be explained without presupposing a controversial metaphysics of propositions. In the same vein, one might think of the notion of a negative proposition, or a modal proposition. In the case of singularity, too, it is reasonable to hope that we could explain this property of propositions without building in a controversial metaphysics. Indeed, by making (NQ) more precise, we will end up below with an example of such a neutral theory.
The notion of a singular proposition is not a metaphysical notion, but a semantic notion.
14 Two clarifications: First, I definitely do not assume that an explanation of singularity should be compatible with any theory of propositions. There may be principled reasons that some theories are incapable of capturing the standard notion of a singular proposition, and we will see below that this turns out to be true of the view that propositions are sets of possible worlds.
But that is compatible with the claim that our explanation should be as neutral as possible. If the proposal below is adequate, that shows that it is unnecessary to assume, e.g., that
propositions have structures and constituents, but also unnecessary to assume the opposite.
Second, I cannot say much at the outset to convert the theorist who already suspects that the hope for a fairly neutral theory of singularity will prove totally unsatisfiable. But there is no reason to be so skeptical from the outset. 13 I thus disagree with Joshua Armstrong and Jason Stanley's claim that "One decided advantage of the framework of Russellian Structured propositions is that it promises to provide a metaphysical basis for the notion of a singular thought about an object, grounding it in terms of constituency" (206). That is not an advantage but a mistake. 14 Cf. Hawthorne and Manley (2012: 15) : "We doubt that metaphysical speculations about the structure of propositions are a promising place to start when thinking about the referential structure of language and singular thought." Related comments can be found in (Kaplan 1989: 493 fn 17) and (Stalnaker 1988: 160) .
Pg. 12 of 29 account of F-hood, but a full account still shouldn't be a prerequisite to an account of G-hood.
Perhaps only things with representational content can be epistemically justified, so any account of belief must be compatible with beliefs having representational content. But an account of justification seems like it could be independent of whether belief should be analysed in, say, functionalist terms. So returning to our topic, to explain what it is for a proposition to be singular does not prima facie require an answer to the question of what a proposition is.
A neutral characterization of singularity
We have just been exploring an attempt to use the notion of a propositional constituent to explain the sense in which a proposition could be directly about an object. An alternative approach is to return to (NQ) and attempt to explain what it is for a proposition to be about an object qua possessor of a property. Direct aboutness could then be understood in contrast -to be directly about an object is to be about it without being about it merely qua possessor of a When we turn to singularity, the analogies with grounding and communicating won't be exact, but the idea is clear enough to get us started. (NQ) recommends that we think of indirect aboutness in terms of whether the properties of an object play a sort of intermediate role between the proposition and the object. As we saw in discussing (DA), the intermediate status of the properties isn't adequately characterized by saying that the proposition is about the object in virtue of the object's properties. Rather, there seems to be something important in the idea that the proposition is about the object qua possessor of those properties. The relationship between the properties and the object is straightforward: the properties are satisfied by the object. But the relationship between the proposition and the properties requires further comment.
If we want to say that the proposition that the tallest mountain is cold is about Everest qua tallest mountain, unlike the proposition that Everest is cold, then we should also contrast the former proposition with the proposition that the most massive mountain is cold, since the latter is The propositions expressed by (5a) and (5b) are both about Everest, but are about it qua possessor of different properties. How can we explain this use of 'qua'? We can start by taking for granted that propositions can not only be about objects, but concern properties and relations as well. (5a) and (5b) concern coldness and mountainhood. The proposition that
Bush paints concerns the property of painting, and the proposition that there is a philosophizing politician concerns the properties of philosophizing and of being a politician.
None of these propositions concern doghood or the property of being made of plastic. I mean to be using an informal notion of concerning that is analogous to the informal notion of aboutness, but pertains to properties rather than particulars. As with aboutness, we can get enough of an intuitive grip on concerning that an explanation relying on that notion can be illuminating even without a definition of it.
Though I won't offer a definition, I can state a heuristic that should make it even more obvious which propositions concern which properties. Let 'F' be a predicate expressing property P and let 'Fness' be a noun referring to P. Then a proposition q concerns P iff q is expressed by a sentence at least one word of which is either 'F' or 'Fness'. This is merely a heuristic because a proposition's concerning a property needn't essentially involve anything linguistic. Compare: It would be an unsatisfying, and perhaps extensionally incorrect, definition of aboutness to say that a proposition is about an object iff the proposition is expressed by a sentence in which at least one expression denotes the object. The appeal to linguistic items seems out of place when we were looking for a relation between a proposition and an object. And of course we might
want to leave open the possibility that there are ineffable propositions that are about various objects or concern various properties.
16
Now return to the idea that (5a) and (5b) are about Everest, but about Everest qua possessor o f different properties. How can we replace the 'qua'-talk with something clearer? To begin with, we should note that (5a) and (5b) concern different properties. Moreover, since Everest is 15Thanks to Katherine Hawley for suggestions here. 16 I intend my use of the term 'concern' to be as neutral as possible on the metaphysics of propositions. What about very coarsegrained, unstructured views of propositions? Even proponents of such views seem comfortable writing of propositions attributing properties to objects. For example, writing of a given individual and attribute, Stalnaker refers to "the proposition that attributes the attribute to the individual" (2009: 237). I am not sure Stalnaker is entitled to use this sort of terminology, however; see the end of the below discussion of (FV). The more general point, though, is that having structured propositions is independent of having a notion of a proposition concerning a property. One could have a finer-grained view than Stalnaker's on which propositions are sets of situations or perhaps sets of possible and impossible worlds, or even a view on which propositions are sui generis abstracta.
17/12/15
Pg. 14 of 29 (we're assuming) the tallest and most massive mountain, the propositions concern different properties of Everest. And crucially, of course, the properties are each uniquely possessed by Everest -it is by exploiting that fact that (5a) and (5b) get to be about Everest. So instead of saying that the propositions are about Everest qua possessor of different properties, we say that it is by concerning different properties of Everest that the propositions get to be about Everest.
This clarifies the qua-talk a bit by cashing it out in terms of which properties of Everest the proposition concerns.
If we turn now to the proposition that Everest is cold, we can easily state the difference between this proposition and the one expressed by (5a): the latter, but not the former, gets to be about Everest by concerning a property of Everest. 17 If the proposition that Everest is cold is true, then it concerns a property of Everest, coldness, but it is about Everest independently.
The proposition that the tallest mountain is cold concerns coldness as well as another property of Everest, being a mountain taller than any other, and it is by concerning the latter property that the proposition gets to be about Everest. This is the key to the distinction between singular aboutness and general aboutness. We can state our characterization of singularity as follows.
ABOUTNESS BY PROPERTIES (AP):
A proposition p about an object o is singular wrt o iff p is about o, but not merely about o by concerning one or more properties of o.
The qualification 'merely' is meant to allow for cases like (4), where a proposition is about an object twice-over -(4) is about George H.W. Bush by concerning one of his properties, but it is also about him independently of concerning his properties. When applying (AP) to simple propositions, 'merely' can be ignored.
An initial benefit of this account of singularity is that, unlike (AC), it captures the phenomenon without presupposing any controversial metaphysics of propositions. It could be adopted within various metaphysical frameworks, however, since everyone should accept our assumption that propositions can be about objects and properties. Someone who favours Russellian propositions, for instance, will find no conflict between (AP) and their notion of representation by constituency. Equally, (AP) could be unproblematically adapted within 17 This strategy for characterizing singularity resembles that of Bach, who elaborates his notions of relationality and satisfactionality (mentioned in an earlier footnote) by writing that a singular thought about an object "does not have to represent its being in that relation to the object" (2010 :55). Bach himself rejects singular propositions, but (AP) below could serve for others as a transposition of his ideas from the domain of singular thoughts to propositions. Two other points of departure: Bach thinks of token thoughts as built out of representational vehicles, whereas a proposition is not, as far as I'm assuming here, built out of representational vehicles. If a proposition is something like a set of situations, or a sui generis entity, it might be a representation in a different sense than the sense in which a token concept is a representation. (I'm not sure everyone in this literature would be comfortable calling propositions "representations" at all.) Nevertheless, I'm assuming that they can be about or concern particulars as well as properties. Second, I think even a general proposition needn't "represent" its being in a relation to the object its about -it needn't "represent" anything about itself, and doesn't in the usual case.
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An even more significant benefit of (AP) is the way in which it connects with the motivating ideas behind discussions of singularity. still differ in who they think about when they have first-personal attitudes. They must not, it seems, be thinking of themselves merely as whoever satisfies certain qualitative conditions.
It may be worth briefly noting how (AP) avoids a problem raised earlier for (DA). (DA)
relied on the idea that a general proposition is about an object in virtue of that object's properties, and we noted that too many propositions would satisfy that description. According to theories like Salmon's, even a structured proposition with an object as a constituent, e.g. < o, tallness >, is about the object in virtue of the object's properties (namely, being a constituent of the proposition). On the improved proposal (AP) Further advantages of (AP) are revealed when we consider the prospects for other metaphysically neutral accounts of singularity. These competitors struggle with phenomena that pose no problem at all for (AP). Let's now turn to these accounts.
Other neutral accounts
There are a number of characterizations of singularity in the literature that resemble (AP) in 18 Nelson and Fitch helpfully discuss the below motivations for the singular / general distinction alongside the reduplication argument.
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Pg. 16 of 29 not presupposing any claims about the metaphysics of propositions. They thus have a certain advantage over (AC). Some of them also have an appealing simplicity to them. However, I will argue that each of them faces problems that are easily avoided by (AP). Thus the positive proposal above turns out to be the most satisfactory option.
Truth-value dependence
Iris Einheuser introduces the notion of singularity with the example of a "singular proposition about Socrates, a proposition that "directly involves" Socrates in the sense that its truth value turns, necessarily, on how things stand with Socrates" (Einheuser 2012: 1) .
Similarly, Stalnaker (1988: 160) says that "For those who adopt the possible worlds conception of a proposition, a singular proposition will be a proposition whose truth in any given possible world depends on the properties of some particular individual." We can make the idea a bit more formal as follows:
TRUTH-VALUE DEPENDENCE (TV): A proposition p about an object o is singular wrt o iff for some property F, necessarily p is true iff o has F.
19
This seems to correctly classify the proposition that the F is G as a non-singular proposition.
For that proposition is actually true iff a certain F (o1, say) is G, but if a different object o2 had been uniquely F, the proposition would have been true iff o2 had been G. So there is no object o such that necessarily, the proposition is true iff o is G.
But there is a significant problem with (TV). If o is the actual G, (TV) incorrectly predicts that the proposition that the actual G is F is singular wrt o since necessarily that proposition is about o and is true iff o is F. 20 ('The actual G' is a rigid designator of o.) The problem
generalizes to all propositions we would express using de facto rigid designators. For instance, take the proposition p that the square of two is a boring number. The square of two is the same number, four, in every possible world, so necessarily, p is true iff four is a boring number.
Hence, p is singular wrt four according to (TV). But we cannot count p as singular. It fails (NQ), for one thing, as it is about four only qua possessor of a certain property. Someone might entertain that proposition while thinking about four only "indirectly", as whatever object had the property. I am certain that none of Salmon, Soames, Kaplan, Recanati, Adams, and so on would accept (TV) in light of the problem just raised.
21
19 Once again, note the importance of 'about an object o'. Consider a version of (TV) without the aboutness requirement: A proposition p is singular wrt o iff for some property F, necessarily p is true iff o has F. This thesis would disastrously entail that every necessary proposition is singular with respect to everything that necessarily possesses a certain property! This is an even broader problem than the ones I raise below. 20 It may be a proposition that is singular wrt the actual world, but it is not singular with respect to the actual G. 21 See the end of the discussion of (FV) below for a comment on views that would identify p with the proposition that four is a boring number.
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Someone might hope to avoid the problem just posed for (TV) by replacing the modal explanation of dependence with some other notion. 22 For some sort of dependence, the idea would be this: A proposition p about an object o is singular wrt o iff the truth-value of p in any world depends on whether o possesses a certain property. Without surveying every available notion of dependence it is hard to say that the strategy is totally hopeless, but I do think it is unpromising. For on any notion of dependence I can imagine, the truth-value of the proposition that the square of two is a boring number does depend on the properties of four.
So that proposition will be wrongly counted as singular by this revised approach to truth-value dependence.
In hindsight, it is not surprising that (TV) is unsuccessful. The basic idea motivating discussions of singularity has to do with some sort of non-qualitativeness, as (NQ) and (AP) reflect. But there is just no reason to think that we would have non-qualitative aboutness whenever we have a necessary covariation between a proposition's truth-value and the properties of an individual. Obviously some properties are always possessed by the same individual, so those properties can be exploited to combine qualitative aboutness with the right sort of covariation. Similarly, Tim Crane describes token singular thoughts by saying that "the singularity of a singular thought is guaranteed by the thought having a content which either contains or is constitutively dependent on the particular object it is about. So if that object had not existed the content would not either, and neither would the thought episode " (2011: 24 satisfies the right-hand side of (OD1). Every proposition about it (in the intuitive sense of about) will count as singular, even propositions about it only qua possessor of some property!
Object-dependence
The problem manifests itself with propositions like those that refuted (TV). The proposition p that the square of two is a boring number is about the number four. Since four exists necessarily, it is not possible that it does not exist while p does exist. Hence it trivially satisfies the right-hand side of (OD1), so that (OD1) wrongly categorises p as singular wrt four.
The problem with necessary existents has not gone totally unnoticed by proponents of object-dependence, but it has not been taken seriously. McDowell, for instance, begins one paper by stating the view he opposes as one on which a Fregean "can represent an utterance, or a propositional attitude, as being about an object only by crediting it with a content that determines the object by specification, or at least in such a way that the content is available to be thought or expressed whether the object exists or not " (1984: 214) . To hold that not all
Fregean thoughts are like this, so that for some thoughts, it's not the case that they're available whether the object exists or not, is according to McDowell to maintain that there are Fregean de re (singular) thoughts. But in a footnote, he says that his formulation of de re-ness as objectdependence "cannot be right where the object's existence is necessary … But having noted this, I shall ignore it; the issue I want to consider is whether Fregean theory can accommodate de re thoughts outside that area". This is a mistake if McDowell aims to give an accurate characterization of the real insight behind the idea of a singular proposition or a singular thought, as he professes to do in the quote given earlier. We should neither be prevented from explaining what makes some propositions about necessary existents singular, nor forced to give wholly different accounts of singularity depending on whether or not the object in question exists necessarily.
One attempt to repair (OD1) would be to replace the modal language with a different means for capturing the idea of dependence. While the proposition that the square of two is a boring number exists only in worlds in which four exists, it seems plausible that the existence of that proposition doesn't depend on the existence of four. Let's try to state the thesis as follows:
OBJECT DEPENDENCE 2 (OD2): A proposition p about an object o is singular wrt o iff p's existence depends on o's existence.
To find a counterexample to (OD2), the strategy would be to find a proposition p and immediately deeming every proposition to be singular wrt itself. on his father's existence, you will probably still think that his existence depends on the existence of some object o non-identical with W. In that case, we can construct a new counterexample by taking an appropriate property F that o uniquely possesses and considering the proposition that the F respects George W. Bush. Again, it will incorrectly follow from (OD2) that the proposition is singular wrt o.
Someone might try to avoid the sort of counterexample above by appealing to a nontransitive notion of dependence. One version of this strategy would be to appeal to some sort o f direct dependence. We could spell the notion out this way: B directly depends on A iff B depends on A and there's no C that depends on A and on which B depends. It is not clear, however, that a singular proposition's existence directly depends on the relevant object's existence. We want the idea of object-dependence to be compatible with various views of propositions, including views on which propositions have constituents, and on such a view, it seems likely that singular propositions will sometimes have constituents with constituents as constituents. For example, the proposition not-p might contain the proposition p as a constituent, and the latter might contain an object o as a constituent. Plausibly, in that case not-p's existence would not directly depend on o's existence, since it would depend on p's existence and p's existence would depend on o's existence. The problem here is that a version of (OD) stated in terms of direct dependence would then fail to count not-p as singular wrt o.
Of course, the true metaphysics of propositions might avoid the problem with this particular example, but the broader point is that it is just not clear whether singular propositions will directly depend on the objects wrt which they're singular. Rather than looking for other non-transitive refinements of (OD2) to refute, I will note two things. First, it seems likely that for any notion of dependence, there will be some property R Pg. 20 of 29
other than identity such that for any things x, y, and z, if x's existence depends on y's existence and y bears R to z, then x's existence depends on z's existence. If that is so, then it will be possible to construct a counterexample to a version of (OD) that incorporates the relevant notion of dependence. For some y and z such that yRz, simply find an appropriate property F uniquely possessed by z and consider the proposition that the F is self-identical and y is selfidentical. That proposition will be about z and will be singular wrt y, but will not be singular wrt z. But (OD) will deem it singular wrt z. Second, a perfectly general consideration should lead us to expect that any version of (OD) will fail: (OD) bears no close relationship to the basic idea behind singularity captured in (NQ). Why think that if a proposition or thought is about an object merely qua possessor of some qualities, it's existence can't still depend on the object's existence? It could. To defend (OD) it is not enough to be granted one direction of the thesis, that a proposition or thought's existence will depend on an object if it's about the object in some non-qualitative way.
Function-value
The most prominent champion of coarse-grained propositions, Stalnaker, not only holds that an account of singularity is compatible with his view of propositions, but he offers an account of his own, one that differs from the gloss noted above. According to Stalnaker, what is "essential to the idea of a singular proposition is that the identity of a singular proposition is a function of an individual rather than of some concept or mode of presentation of the individual" (1988: 160). He makes a similar remark elsewhere, claiming that singular propositions "can be defined as propositions that are the values of the propositional functions that are defined in terms of attributes" (Stalnaker 2009: 238) . The idea seems to be this: Take an attribute, e.g. the property of being old. We can use that attribute to form a function from individuals to propositions. The function maps o1 to one proposition, maps o2 to another proposition, and so on. Staying as close to Stalnaker's formulation above as we can, a first pass at formulating the thesis is this:
FUNCTION VALUE (FV): A proposition p about an object o is singular wrt o iff for o as argument, a function defined in terms of attributes has p as its value.
But we can use the attribute of being old to define a function that maps every individual to the proposition that the tallest human is old. By definition, that proposition is a value of the propositional function for any individual o as argument, but that proposition is not singular.
So (FV) needs to be changed to incorporate something restricting the relevant kind of propositional function. The restriction that Stalnaker seems to think appropriate is not hard to obtain a propositional function" (Kaplan 1986: 241) .
It is worth briefly noting a more general worry about any attempt Stalnaker might make to define singularity. On his view of propositions, necessarily equivalent propositions are identical. Assuming that the proposition that 1289 is prime is singular, it follows that the proposition that every triangle has three sides is singular. Similarly, if o is the actual G, the proposition that the actual G is F is singular so long as the proposition that o is F is singular, for the two propositions are necessarily equivalent. If necessarily equivalent propositions are identical, there is no way to capture the intended singular / general distinction. Drawing the distinction requires a certain fineness of grain. 
Language, thought, and the paradigm of the variable
Discussions of singularity often make use of English supplemented with explicit variables.
According to Soames (2010a: 19) , e.g., singular propositions are propositions of the sort expressed by 'x is visible only in the morning' relative to an assignment of Venus to 'x'.
Variables are taken to be the paradigms of direct reference, and hence to be the paradigmatic tools for expressing singular propositions.
VARIABLE PARADIGM 1 (VP1): A proposition p about an object o is singular wrt o iff p is expressed by some open sentence φ(x) relative to some assignment of o to 'x'.
Other authors offer material-mode variants of the idea, using rather than mentioning a variable. For instance, Kit Fine writes that "A singular proposition ... is merely one to the effect that an object x has a certain property " (2005: 22) .
25 I suspect that Stalnaker really had in mind some notion like singularly expressing a proposition, a notion that would capture the way that a referential expression contributes to the determination of a proposition. (The reader might note that the quotes above strongly resemble Stalnaker's explanation of direct reference in Mere Possibilities (94).) His framework might more easily accommodate such a sentence-or term-relative notion of singularity than it could accommodate a monadic property of propositions. This would certainly not be the notion of singularity intended in most of the literature, however, as the latter is not supposed to be relative to a linguistic item. Could a relative notion of singularity do all the work that singularity has been intended to do? (Thanks to X for pressing me on this question.) I think not, but cannot defend that answer fully here, as it would require a lengthy survey of various roles for singular propositions such as those mentioned in the introduction above, and the issues seem to me quite puzzling. To briefly take just one concern mentioned above that is relevant to Stalnaker (2012) , consider the claim that a proposition that is singular wrt o could not have existed if o did not exist. If the same proposition could be singular wrt o relative to one term and general wrt o relative to another term, what are we to make of the concern? The question now seems more perplexing.
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Pg. 23 of 29 VARIABLE PARADIGM 2 (VP2): A proposition p about an object x is singular wrt x iff p is the proposition that x has a certain property.
Perhaps Fine and Soames only mean to provide heuristics to identify singular propositions, but one could take their statements in a more serious way, as attempts to say what it is for a proposition to be singular. Although I don't want to overstate the force of the concern, it would certainly be strange if we needed to define singularity by means of an artificial technical device. If any devices of natural language, e.g. anaphoric pronouns, are variables, then (VP1) and (VP2) give us no more than we could get by sticking with something like this:
VARIABLE PARADIGM 3 (VP3): A proposition p about an object is singular wrt that object iff p is the proposition that it has a certain property.
One reason Fine and Soames may have chosen (VP1) and (VP2) instead of (VP3) could simply be that the latter requires an additional empirical assumption if it is to reflect the view that variables are the paradigm tools for expressing singular propositions: that pronouns in English have the semantics of variables. (The thesis employs 'it' rather than an explicit variable.) As
Hawthorne and Manley (14) point out, this empirical assumption may be false, a worry that does not affect (VP1) or (VP2), so fans of the variable paradigm may be safer sticking with one of the latter two.
Regardless of whether pronouns are variables, a simple objection to all three theses is that they don't tell us what singularity is. They might be extensionally adequate, but they are uninformative in just the way that (FV2) is. In fact, (VP2) is essentially just (FV2) with the superfluous mention of functions stripped away. For a given x, the three versions of (VP) tell us that the proposition that x is F is singular. But what is it about the proposition that x is F that makes it count as singular? We are offered no answer to this question. Pg. 24 of 29 assignments" (16). This reference-first approach to singularity might be compared with a thought-first approach. One could say that a singular proposition is a proposition of the sort that is the content of a singular thought vehicle, where the latter is a vehicle containing a referential concept (assuming it is appropriate to apply the notion of reference to concepts).
We might even synthesize these two accounts of singularity, 26 holding that a singular proposition is one that is the content of a vehicle containing a referential constituent.
VEHICLES-FIRST (VF):
A proposition p about an object x is singular wrt x iff p is the content of a vehicle containing a referential constituent.
This approach faces the same problems that made (VP) and (FV2) Second, the superficiality of (VF) is demonstrated by the fact that it is not obvious how it connects with any of the motivating ideas in discussions of singularity, e.g. being about an 26 Thanks here to Paul Hovda. 27 As discussed in an earlier footnote, someone like Stalnaker may want to tie the notion of singularity to vehicles because he rejects singularity as a monadic property of propositions. Instead, he may want a revisionary notion that captures a relation we might call "singularly expressing". This would be a different proposal than (VF), since the latter holds back from making singularity a relation between a proposition, a particular, and a vehicle. There is unfortunately not enough space here to thoroughly explore potential merits of the relational option. Hawthorne and Manley are more pessimistic about the notion of referentiality (and the related notion of a singular thought). If their worries are justified, there would be a serious threat to vehicle-first approaches to singularity.
As with 'reference', we must decide among competing ideas about what features of a cognitive state are criterial for it to count as a 'singular thought'. The simplest idea we encountered in the Introduction is this: to be a singular thought is to be a cognitive attitude toward a singular content: viz., a content of the sort expressed by sentences containing referential expressions. But in light of the foregoing discussion, it is far from clear whether we have an independent grip on the notion of a referential expression. (248) Unmoored from reference and singular thought, singular propositions would then need to be characterized in other terms. We might even begin to doubt that there is any clear notion of a singular proposition, or that singular propositions have an important role to play in philosophy.
Luckily, (AP) shows that we can develop an account of singularity that is independent of the notions of a referential term and a singular thought. In fact, with (AP) in hand, we can make a first pass at explanations of the latter two notions. A referential term is one such that sentences containing it thereby express singular propositions. A singular thought is one whose content is a singular proposition. These accounts might need further defence or adjustment, but they should not seem surprising. Abstracting away from their views on the metaphysics of propositions, Russell and neo-Russellians like Kaplan have this basic picture of reference. The characterization of singular thought is also familiar -Robin Jeshion, for instance, says that we can usefully characterise a singular thought as a thought whose content is a singular proposition (Jeshion 2010b: 108) .
Having noted this nice benefit of (AP), we can end by recalling some of (AP)'s other advantages, some of which have been revealed by looking at competing accounts of singularity.
(TV) was unable to correctly classify propositions that concerned properties uniquely satisfied Although a full exploration of the significance of these results would require a separate essay, it is worth recalling the connections that we noted at the outset between singularity and a variety of other issues, e.g.: actualism and hacceitism, presentism, quantifying in, acquaintance, and perception and hallucination. Different accounts of singular propositions may cast these issues in different lights. Suppose we want to defend presentism, for instance. If we adopted (AC), the view that singularity is a matter of constituency, then in order to hold that there are singular propositions about future or past objects, we would have to worry about being committed to the existence of things with non-existent constituents -an unappealing commitment for many philosophers. Suppose, on the other hand, that we rejected the Russellian view of propositions while adopting the account of singularity defended above, (AP), according to which singularity is a matter of being about an object without being about it merely by concerning its properties. Then in order to hold that there are singular propositions about future or past objects, we would have to hold that there are things about non-existent objects. This will still seem unappealing to some theorists, but to many it will seem more plausible to hold this view than the view that existing things can have non-existing things as constituents. At any rate, the two commitments flowing from the two accounts of singularity are distinct, which is enough to give a preliminary example of how the results of the above discussion could impact debates elsewhere in philosophy. A more careful examination of this example, or of examples drawn from the other areas mentioned above, is left for future work. 17/12/15
